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Abstract
Personal identiﬁcation number (PIN) blocks are 64-bit strings that encode a PIN ready for encryption and secure transmission
in banking networks. These networks employ tamper-proof hardware security modules (HSMs) to perform sensitive cryptographic
operations, such as checking the correctness of a PIN typed by a customer. The use of these HSMs is controlled by anAPI designed to
enforce security. PIN block attacks are unanticipated sequences ofAPI commands which allow an attacker to determine the value of
a PIN in an encrypted PIN block. This paper describes a framework for formal analysis of such attacks. Our analysis is probabilistic,
and is automated using constraint logic programming and probabilistic model checking.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In an automated teller machine (ATM) network, it is vital to keep the personal identiﬁcation numbers (PINs) typed
in by customers secure as they are passed back to the card issuer for checking. Typically, each PIN is formatted into a
64-bit block, and encrypted under a secret shared key, ready for transmission. Different card issuers prescribe different
ways of formatting PINs into 64-bit blocks. Different encryption keys are used in pairwise communication between
different nodes in the network. As the PIN is passed through zones in theATM network, it may have to be re-formatted
and re-encrypted several times.
To avoid exposing sensitive values in the clear, these PIN block manipulations are carried out inside tamper-proof
hardware security modules (HSMs), which have strictly deﬁned APIs regulating the use of PIN block manipulation
functions. Recently, a family of attacks have been discovered which exploit these operations, and the error checking
performed during them, to determine the value of a PIN in an encrypted block [2,4]. These attacks are serious, sometimes
reducing the number of operations required to guess a PIN to just a dozen or so, making attacks potentially lucrative and
hard to detect. They are also hard forAPI designers to completely eliminate, since a certain amount of the functionality
that gives rise to these attacks is essential for normal operation. To compound the problem, each node in the banking
network typically requires a different set of operations to be supported, and so a different conﬁguration of theAPI. Even
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if amanufacturer’s default conﬁguration is secure, customersmay conﬁgure theHSM is such away as to unintentionally
endanger security.
Following discussions with API designers at a manufacturer of HSMs, nCipher 2 plc., it became clear that a formal
tool was required that would take the speciﬁcation for an API, together with the particular set of PIN block formats
and operations required by a customer, and determine the expected number of guesses required to determine a PIN
using the best available attack. This would allow designers (and customers) to experiment with different conﬁgurations,
varying degrees of legacy support and new block formats, whilst being aware of their effect on the complexity of PIN
guessing.
This paper presents a prototype of such a system. It uses constraint logic programming techniques [3] to reason about
the effects of particular commands on the range of possible PIN values. This reasoning leads to the generation of a
model for all possible attacks, assuming uniform distribution of PINs, which is fed to the probabilistic model checker
PRISM [8]. PRISM extracts the best attack and returns the expected number of operations required to determine the
PIN. If there is no attack that will always determine the PIN, PRISM can return the probability of reducing the number
of possible PIN values to a particular range. A script post-processes the output from PRISM to obtain details of the
best attack for the designer to study.
In the rest of this paper, we will ﬁrst explain the family of attacks we are concerned with, in Section 2. In Section 3,
we show how we generate models of possible attacks for a given conﬁguration.We explain our use of PRISM in Section
4, showing how we process the output to obtain details of the most effective attack. Results on a number of differentAPI
conﬁgurations are given in Section 5. We consider related work in Section 6, further work in Section 7, and conclude
in Section 8.
2. Background
HSMs are used inATM networks to protect sensitive data, such as cryptographic keys and PINs, from eavesdroppers,
hackers and corrupt employees.AnHSM typically consists of a tamper-proof enclosure containing a processor equipped
to perform cryptographic operations and a small amount of memory. This memory is commonly used to store a master
key for the HSM. All the other keys required to perform PIN generation, veriﬁcation, encryption and so on are stored
outside the HSM, encrypted under the HSM’s master key. They can only be used by feeding them back into the HSM,
along with the relevant data to be manipulated. This means that all sensitive values such as PINs and keys only exist ‘in
the clear’ inside the tamper-proof enclosure. The operations allowed by the HSM are governed by a strict API, which
is designed to impose security. This is achieved, for example, by imposing types on keys, and only allowing certain
types of keys to be used for certain operations.
SecurityAPIs can be thought of as a set of two-party security protocols, each one consisting of an input from the user,
and a response from the HSM. The attacker may compose these protocols in any way he chooses to effect an attack. In
recent years, several such attacks have been found on theseAPIs [1,4]. Some of these are attacks on the key-management
scheme, and can be detected by techniques similar to those for conventional security protocol analysis [6,13,14].
Others are ﬂaws in PIN processing, so-called ‘PIN Block Attacks’ [4,2]. These attacks involve the attacker reasoning
about the possible values of a PIN contained in an encrypted PIN block (EPB). His knowledge of the PIN is affected
by the responses from the HSM to various commands. These ‘informed guessing’ attacks are outside the scope of
previous approaches to security protocol analysis. It is the latter type of attack that we are concerned with in this
paper.
PIN block attacks assume that the attacker has access to an HSM, and a correct, but encrypted, PIN typed by a
customer. He has access to the key required to verify the PIN, i.e. to obtain a yes/no answer from the HSM as to
whether the PIN is correct, but only in its ‘safe’, encrypted form—so he must use it under the terms of the API. The
problem for the attacker is to manipulate the inputs to the API commands in order to determine the value of the PIN
in as few operations as possible. We are concerned in this paper with three families of PIN block attacks: digitwise
attacks such as ISO-0 conversion attacks, decimalisation table (dectab) attacks, and brute-force guessing attacks such
as the check value attack. We will explain each of these in turn.
2 http://www.ncipher.com/.
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2.1. ISO-0 (ANSI X7.8) attacks
The ISO-0 attacks [4, p. 75] are a family of digitwise attacks, i.e. attacks which determine each PIN digit in turn.
The ISO-0 attacks are so-called because they exploit a property of the ISO-0 PIN block format. 3 For a four-digit PIN,
the ISO block format is deﬁned like this:
B1 = 0 4 P1 P2 P3 P4 F F F F F F F F F F,
B2 = 0 0 0 0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12,
PIN block = B1B2.
Each character in the block represents a 4-bit nybble. The 0 at the beginning of B1 marks the block as being in format
0. The 4 indicates the length of the PIN, in this case four digits. The Pis are the digits of the PIN, the F s are the ﬁxed
hexadecimal values F , and the Ais are the 12 digits of the customer’s personal account number (PAN). The symbol
signiﬁes bitwise exclusive-or (XOR). The principle behind XORing the PIN against the PAN is to diversify blocks
containing the same PIN, to defeat ‘code book’ attacks by eavesdroppers.
The attack arises when the PAN has to be supplied to a command in order, for example, for the EPB to be translated
into another format. For this operation, the block will be decrypted inside the HSM, and then the supplied PAN will be
XORed against the clear block to reveal the top line (B1), so that the PIN digits can be formatted another way. At this
point, the HSM performs an error check, to see if all the PIN digits are of decimal value. Now, suppose that instead of
supplying the correct PAN, the attacker supplies a modiﬁed PAN. This modiﬁcation could be to XOR in the value 8
against the ﬁrst digit, producing A′1 = A18. Now, if the third PIN digit P3 is 0, 1, 8 or 9, the error check will still
pass, since these values XOR 8 all give a decimal value. However, if the PIN digit is in the range 2–7, the HSM will
signal an error, since these values all XOR against 8 to give a value between A and F hexadecimal.
By repeating this process with various values, an attacker can narrow down the value of the third PIN digit. He can
only narrow it down to a pair of possible values though, since each pair of digits, 0 and 1, 2 and 3, etc., will give an
identical pattern of errors and passes when XORed against values chosen by the attacker.
As it stands, this attack is only applicable to the third and fourth PIN digits, since in the prescribed format, there is
no overlap between the PAN and the ﬁrst and second digits. Clulow devised an extension to the attack to overcome
this. The trick is to pass off the ISO-0 PIN block as being under a different format, namely VISA-3. TheVISA-3 block
format looks like this:
P1 P2 P3 P4 F F F F F F F F F F F F.
Suppose for a moment that the PAN is 00000000000, so our ISO-0 block looks like
0 4 P1 P2 P3 P4 F F F F F F F F F F . Now suppose we give the HSM an ISO-0 PIN block, claim that
it is in VISA-3 format, and ask for it to be translated to ISO-0 format. The result is
0 6 0 4 P1 P2 P3 P4 F F F F F F F F.
Why? Because the HSM ﬁrst looks for a left-justiﬁed F-terminated string of decimal digits as a VISA-3 PIN Block.
It ﬁnds 0 4 P1 P2 P3 P4 . This it assumes to be a six-digit PIN, 4 which it reformats in the ISO-0 style. Now the real
PIN digits have been shifted so that they will all overlap with the PAN, and so can be attacked by the above method.
Furthermore, when we consider the possibilities when using a non-zero PAN, the attack enables us to determine all
digits uniquely. This is because there are now three possibilities for the digits overlapping the PIN: they can be decimal,
and accepted as a part of the PIN; they can be F, marking the end of the PIN (and also causing no error); or they can be
in the range A–E hexadecimal, in which case an error will be reported. This allows the attacker to determine the exact
value of a PIN. In this paper, we show that the expected number of operations for this attack is 3.4 for each PIN digit,
making 13.6 operations for a four-digit PIN.
3 This is format 0 in ISO Standard 9564-1 (2002). It is the same as the ANSI X7.8 standard format.
4 ISO Standard 9564-1 (2002) speciﬁes that PINs may be between four and 12 digits long.
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2.2. Dectab attacks
This family of attacks was discovered by both Bond and Zielin´ski [2] and Clulow [4, Section 3.5.5]. Many PIN
schemes 5 assign PIN values by encrypting a customer’s PAN under a secret PIN derivation key (PDK), and then
decimalising the result using a dectab.A dectab maps each hexadecimal value to a decimal. The ‘standard’dectab looks
like this:
Hex. value 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
Dec. value 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
So, if the ﬁrst four digits of the result of encrypting a customer’s PAN under the PDK are 4A6B hexadecimal, the
assigned PIN will be 4061. Some schemes allow the customer to change her PIN at anATM. This is achieved by ﬁxing
an offset, which when added digitwise modulo 10 to the original PIN, gives the customer’s chosen PIN. This offset
is not considered to be security critical, since without the original PIN it provides no help in guessing the correct
customer PIN.
Dectab attacks do not determine the PIN digitwise, but rather determine ﬁrst what digits are in the PIN, and then
where these digits are. Suppose an attacker has an EPB which, when supplied along with the standard dectab and a
known offset, correctly veriﬁes inside the HSM (that is, the HSM reports that the PIN is correct). Now suppose the
attacker alters the dectab like this:
Old value 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
New value 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 1 2 3 4 5
He then tries the PIN veriﬁcation again, with the modiﬁed dectab. If the veriﬁcation still passes, then he knows there are
no 0s in the PIN. If, however, the veriﬁcation now fails, he knows there must be at least one 0 in the PIN somewhere.
The problem now is to determine how many, and where. This can be accomplished by altering the offset. The attacker
advances the offset by one at each position, and then at every combination of positions, until the PIN is once again
reported as being correct. This reveals the location of the 0s in the PIN. The table below illustrates the process, for
an example where the customer’s PIN is 3060, and the offset is 0000. We assume the attacker has already tried the
modiﬁed dectab shown above, and discovered that there is at least one 0 somewhere in the PIN.
Attacker set offset Result from HSM Knowledge of PIN
0001 Incorrect PIN ????
0010 Incorrect PIN ????
0100 Incorrect PIN ????
1000 Incorrect PIN ????
0011 Incorrect PIN ????
0101 Correct PIN ?0?0
The dectab attack, as described by Bond, takes an average of 16.5 guesses to determine a four-digit PIN [2].
2.3. Brute-force guessing attacks
ANSI standard X7.8 speciﬁes that ‘The system shall not be capable of being used or misused to determine a PIN by
exhaustive trial and error’. However, APIs can sometimes inadvertently allow this. An example of such an attack is the
check value attack discovered by Clulow [4, Section 3.5.8]. It relies on an attacker being able to obtain the check value
of a PIN derivation key (i.e. a 64-bit block of zeros encrypted under that key). Many APIs support a key check value
5 For example, the IBM 3624 scheme, Netherlands PIN-1 scheme, and the German Bank Pool Scheme.
G. Steel / Theoretical Computer Science 367 (2006) 257–270 261
command, used to ensure that a key has been imported correctly. The attacker must also be able to supply a block of
0s as the PAN to a command for verifying PINs calculated using the method shown above (Section 2.2).
The ﬁrst step is to obtain the check value of the PDK, and decimalise the ﬁrst four characters of the result using
the standard dectab. Store this as IPIN. Now, supply a PAN of 000000000000 to the verify PIN function, along with
some EPB you want to crack. Start with offset 0000. Generally, the command will at ﬁrst fail. Increase the offset by 1
until the command reports a successful veriﬁcation. Store the ﬁnal offset as OFFSET. Now we know that the PIN in
the block veriﬁes successfully when compared against IPIN + OFFSET (mod 10 each digit), and so this must be the
customer’s PIN.
On average, for a four-digit PIN, this attack would require one call to the check value command and 5000 calls to the
PIN verify function. Although not very efﬁcient in itself, attacks like these can be sometimes be combined with others
to ﬁnish off the cracking of a PIN, so it is important to know if such attacks are possible on a givenAPI conﬁguration.
2.4. The problem for API designers
API designers face the problem that they are aware of these attacks, but often have no choice but to support the
functionality that gives rise to them. Legacy PIN schemes must be supported, various different PIN block formats may
be needed, and different dectabs may be used by different card providers. They must ﬁnd ways of ‘locking down’
(i.e. preventing an attacker from manipulating) certain inputs to the API in order to thwart the attacks. The problem is
to ﬁnd ways of doing this that result in minimal inconvenience and loss of ﬂexibility for their customers. To add to the
problem, each customer typically conﬁgures theAPI is a different way, specifying a list of commands they require and
other parameters such as dectabs and settings on keys. The approach taken in this paper was motivated by discussions
with a manufacturer of HSMs, nCipher. They indicated that what was required was a system that would determine the
best (known) attack available as for a particular conﬁguration of their API. It is important that the system is simple
enough for theAPI designers to be able to change it as new types of attack are discovered. We present here a prototype
for such a system, based on constraint logic programming and probabilistic model checking.
3. Generating models
We model PIN cracking attacks as trees. Each node in the tree represents a state, where the attacker knows the PIN
is in a certain range. For one particular attack, the edges in the tree will represent probabilistic choices, e.g. where the
attacker tries a command, and the HSM may or may not report an error, depending on the actual (unknown) value of the
PIN. The probabilities of each outcome depend only on properties of the state we are in, i.e. our attacks are represented
by Markov chains (MCs). For a family of attacks, the tree will contain both probabilistic choices and non-deterministic
choices, where the attacker chooses what he will try next. A family of attacks is thus represented by a Markov decision
process (MDP). The idea is to analyse security in two stages: ﬁrst, to generate an MDP representing all possible attacks,
and then to use a probabilistic model checker to analyse the MDP and choose the MC representing the most effective
attack. This is either the attack that determines the PIN in the lowest number of steps, or in situations where no such
attack exists, the attack that reduces the PIN to the smallest number of possible values.
More formally, the nodes in our trees represent states as tuples. The ﬁrst four elements of the tuple, P1, . . . , P4, are
constrained integers representing the intruder’s knowledge of the PIN. In the initial state, all four are constrained to
the range 0, . . . , 9. Successive nodes in a path through the tree will have monotonically decreasing ranges of possible
values. The other three values in the tuple record information for the special case of the dectab attack. Section 3.2 below
explains their meaning and usage.
Edges in the tree denote transitions. From each node, there are n sets of edges available, for some n ∈ N. If n = 0
then the node is an endpoint (for example, when all the PIN digits have been uniquely determined, or when no further
operations are available). If n = 1, there is only one set of possible transitions from this node. Otherwise, each set of
edges represents a non-deterministic choice. There are one or two edges in each set. A transition set with two edges
represents an intruder calling an HSM command with some particular input values. One edge represents the successful
execution of the command, and the other represents theHSM reporting an error. Each edge has an associated probability.
The sum of these probabilities is 1. Additionally, each edge has an associated cost of 1, representing one command
call. A transition set with one edge represents brute-force guessing. The probability associated with this edge is 1,
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Fig. 1. Part of a model for the ISO-0 attack family.
and the cost depends on the range of possible PIN values represented by the node from which the edge originates
(see Section 3.3).
As an example, Fig. 1 shows a fragment from one of our trees. The line styles indicate non-deterministic choices, i.e.
the pair of solid lines indicate one non-deterministic choice, the dashed lines another, etc. The numbers on each edge
indicate probabilities. For simplicity, the nodes are labelled only with the variable whose constraint changes during the
transitions shown, i.e. the third PIN digit, P3. This tree represents three possible initial steps the intruder could take
with an API that supports the ISO-0 format and a translation function.
To construct an exhaustive tree of possible attacks for a given API and conﬁguration, we use constraint logic
programming in SICStus PROLOG [3]. This is suitable because the constraint system allows us to refer easily to the
range of possible values of a PIN or PIN digit, resulting in concise code. We also make use of facilities for meta-
programming in PROLOG, i.e. writing clauses which generate the program, which in turn generates the model. Hence
model construction proceeds in two phases: in the ﬁrst phase, we analyse the API and the conﬁguration chosen by the
customer, and assert clauses for all operations available to the intruder. In the second phase, we ﬁnd all possible ways
of chaining these commands together to try to determine the PIN.
Fig. 2 shows how the different parts of the system, which we call AnaBlock, relate to each other. The purpose of the
conﬁg ﬁle is to specify an exact conﬁguration of a product that a customer is considering installing. The ﬁrst part of
this ﬁle is a list of commands in the HSM’s API that the customer intends to enable. The second part speciﬁes other
install-time options speciﬁc to theAPI in question. For example, for the nCipher payShieldAPI, if IBM PIN veriﬁcation
keys are used, the customer can specify a number n for each key that speciﬁes the number of right-justiﬁed PAN digits
which must appear in the validation data. The minimum n that is used in an installation can have an impact on the best
available attack, so is included in the conﬁg ﬁle.
The API ﬁle is designed to be modiﬁed by an API designer or security engineer. It consists of a set of rules which
specify what operations are available to an intruder when particular commands have been enabled. Currently, the main
weakness of our system is that some detailed work is required to produce an AnaBlock API ﬁle from the written
speciﬁcation of the API. This work must be done by hand for each API, though our experience in modelling the IBM
4758 CCA API and nCipher payShield API suggest that much work can be re-used. Though this method seems to
work well for assessing the vulnerability of a system to families of known attacks, it does not provide any guarantees
of security against unknown attacks, although the process of writing these API deﬁnition ﬁles has already allowed
us to discover a previously unknown variation of the ISO-0 attack (see Section 4). The main aim of our immediate
future work will be to address these problems, by allowing the API designer to directly specify the operation of API
commands, and then analysing this speciﬁcation automatically to generate the API deﬁnition ﬁle (see Section 7).
The rules in theAPI ﬁle are used byAnaBlock to meta-program the clauses of a recursively deﬁned predicate called
determine. Each clause corresponds to a particular HSM command, with particular values for the user-set inputs
like the PAN and offset. By executing a suitable findall query on this predicate, we generate the tree of all possible
attacks. The determine clauses are meta-programmed in such a way as to restrict the paths that can be taken in the
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Fig. 2. AnaBlock system diagram.
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Digitwise Brute force
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Fig. 3. Operation of determine predicate.
tree to those which make some sense. This is accomplished by labelling each operation as being digitwise, an operation
on the whole PIN, or a guessing step. Then, since brute-force guessing is expensive, we only allow such operations to
be used when nothing else applies to the state we are in. Whole-PIN operations can only be used on a given state if
no digitwise operations are available, and guessing steps only when nothing else is available. This pattern of execution
of the determine predicate is illustrated in Fig. 3. As a further optimisation, to break symmetry when considering
digitwise operations, we try ﬁrst all digitwise operations on the ﬁrst digit of the PIN, and then the second, then the third
and then the fourth.
3.1. Modelling digitwise operations
A determine clause for a digitwise operation creates two new states: one corresponding to the intruder’s revised
knowledge of the PIN if an error is signalled by the HSM, and one corresponding to that for a successful execution
of the command. The determine predicate is then recursively called on these two states. The following algorithm
describes in detail the operation of such a clause:
(1) If we have already tried this command on the same PIN range, stop.
(2) Calculate the overlap between the range of PIN values accepted by this command, and the current range of possible
PIN Values. Call this Accept_Range.
(3) Calculate the overlap between the range of PIN values rejected by this command, and the current range of possible
PIN Values. Call this Error_Range.
(4) If Accept_Range = ∅ or Error_Range = ∅, stop.
(5) Count total number of possible PINs that satisfy Accept_Range.
Call this p.
(6) Count total number of possible PINs that satisfy Error_Range.
Call this q.
(7) Output in PRISM format a transition, with the probability of moving into a state representing Accept_Range
as p/(p + q), and the probability of moving into a state representing Error_Range as q/(p + q).
(8) Recursively call determine on Accept_Range.
(9) Recursively call determine on Error_Range.
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To count the number of possible PINs that satisfy some constrained range,we use the built-inmeta-predicatelabeling
to enumerate all possible assignments of constrained variables. Given that we are assuming uniform distribution of
PINs inside EPBs, this leads directly to the correct probability of getting an error from the HSM. This automated
approach for calculating transition probabilities is an important part of our technique, since it provides modularity, in
the sense that commands can be combined in any order and the probabilities will be correct. This allows us to analyse
varying conﬁgurations and APIs without having to change AnaBlock itself.
3.2. Dectab attacks
As mentioned above, the ﬁrst four arguments of the determine predicate are the PIN digits, each expressed as a
range of possible values. Clauses for modelling whole-PIN operations, i.e. decimalisation attacks, also refer to the last
three arguments. The ﬁfth argument is called Last_Dectab, and contains the value of the last dectab tried against
the PIN. An integer value i here means that the last dectab tried was the standard table modiﬁed by adding 1 to all
values i, following the pattern in Section 2.2. The sixth argument is Last_Dectab_Hit, which records the value
of the dectab last time we hit a digit, i.e. last time the PIN failed to verify after we modiﬁed the table. The seventh is
Last_Offset, which records the last offset value which was tried. Our algorithm for executing the dectab attack
runs like this:
(1) Start with Last_Dectab=-1, Last_Dectab_Hit=11, Last_Offset=0.
(2) If all PIN digits determined, stop.
(3) If Last_Dectab_Hit > Last_Dectab:
Increase Last_Dectab by 1
If the dectab hits, set Last_Dectab_Hit to Last_Dectab and go to 4, else adjust digit constraints and go
to 2.
(4) Increase offset to next suitable value.
(5) If offset hits: set Last_Offset to 0, set the digits hit by the offset to Last_Dectab, set Last_Dectab_Hit
to 11, goto 2.
(6) Goto 4.
This algorithm is executed in AnaBlock by two determine clauses. The ﬁrst succeeds only when the value of
Last_Dectab_Hit is greater than Last_Dectab, in which case it increases the dectab and creates two new
states, one for a dectab hit and one for a miss, and recursively calls determine on these states. The second clause
succeeds only when Last_Dectab_Hit is equal to Last_Dectab, in which case the offset is increased by one
and two new states are again created, one for an offset hit and one for a miss. The values of Last_Offset and
Last_Dectab_Hit are adjusted as required for these states, and again a recursive call is made.
To apply suitable constraints to the PIN digits for these newly created states, wemake use of the SICStus propositional
constraints mechanism. For example, if we get a dectab hit with the dectab increased at position 2, we know at least
one of the PIN digits is 2. We add the following constraint to the PIN digits in the new state created:
P1 = 2 ∨ P2 = 2 ∨ P3 = 2 ∨ P4 = 2.
To adjust the constraints for a dectab miss, it is a simple matter of removing the dectab value from the range of possible
values for each digit. An offset miss is more complicated, and requires propositional constraints. Again, this is best
illustrated by an example. Suppose we have had the dectab hit at position 2, as above. Suppose the ﬁrst suitable offset
to try is 0001. If this fails to verify, then we know that either the last PIN digit is not 2, or if it is 2, then there is at least
one other 2 in the PIN. This is most concisely expressed by adding the following constraint to the state created:
¬(P1 = 2 ∧ P2 = 2 ∧ P3 = 2 ∧ P4 = 2).
Note that our scheme for the dectab attack is a little different to the original method proposed by Bond. His attacker
ﬁrst tried all dectab values, collated the hits, and then stepped through the offsets as required, resulting in an average
of 16.5 operations to determine the PIN. Our scheme is fractionally more efﬁcient, requiring 16.15 operations (see
Section 5), but more pertinently it is simpler to describe as a transition system for a model checker.
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3.3. Brute-force attacks
A brute-force attack is available when, for example, as explained in Section 2.3, a check value command and an
IBM PIN veriﬁcation command are enabled. In this case, a determine clause is added to the model which simulates
this brute-force attack as a single ‘black box’ transition, with probability 1 of success, and with an associated cost
of (n/2) + 1 for a state representing n possible PIN values (the 1 is the initial call to the check value function).
Different brute-force guessing attacks may have different costs—each one is added along with the relevant formula
for calculating the cost. Note that the actual values of the PIN variables are not set by a brute-force guessing step, but
we do not recursively call determine on the resulting state, so the node reached becomes an endpoint. In the output
for PRISM, this transition sets the four Boolean variables P1_guessed, P2_guessed, etc. to true. This allows us
to specify this guessed state together with those where the PIN digits have been set to unique values when we do our
model checking.
3.4. Output for PRISM
The models we output for the probabilistic model checker PRISM are written in PRISM’s own input language [8].
Each model consists of a single PRISM ‘module’, or process. PRISM does not reason directly about constraints, so we
must create explicit Boolean variables for representing PINdigit ranges (P1_could_be0, P1_could_be1,...).
We also add a variable which holds the number of possible PINs represented by a particular state. This is calculated
by AnaBlock, again using the labeling/2 meta-predicate. This variable, PIN_Possibilities, is used for
specifying properties when model checking. Finally, as mentioned above, our PRISM models include the four extra
Boolean variables P1_guessed, P2_guessed, etc. In the initial state, these are set to false. They are set to true as
each PIN digit is determined, or when brute-force guessing is used to guess all digits.
4. Analysing models
Having generated a model reﬂecting all the options available to the attacker, we use PRISM to analyse the model to
extract the best attack.We used a beta-release of PRISM version 3.0, which is now publicly available. The costs/reward
mechanism is still under development, and this is the ﬁrst version which allows the user to export the costs for each
transition, which is necessary to reconstruct attacks discovered by our method. PRISM has several engines for model
checking, but currently only the multi-terminal binary decision diagram (MTBDD) engine supports costs and rewards
calculations. PRISM supports PCTL [7] a probabilistic extension of the CTL logic, as its language for describing
properties of MDPs.
4.1. Checking correctness
Before examining attacks, we would like to be sure that the models we have created are in some sense correct.
The use of a model checker gives us a natural means of doing this. We can specify some correctness properties to
PRISM and have them checked automatically for us. For example, for attacks like the dectab attack which we know are
capable of determining the correct PIN, we would like to be sure that the probability of eventually arriving in a state
where all digits are known is 1. This is achieved by checking the following property, as speciﬁed in PRISM’s syntax
for PCTL:
Pmax =? [true U (P1_guessed ∧ P2_guessed ∧ P3_guessed ∧ P4_guessed)]. (†)
The U is the (strong) until operator in PCTL. By stating the property with Pmax =?, we are asking PRISM not to
check the property, but to return the probability that the property holds, i.e. that eventually all digits are guessed. We
can further check that the chances of the ﬁnal PIN being any particular value are exactly 0.0001, or 1 in 10 000. By
doing this, we check that our transition probabilities have been calculated correctly to reﬂect a uniform distribution of
PIN values. We can auto-generate a large ﬁle containing this property for all possible PINs, and have that checked, or
be satisﬁed with checking each digit individually (which requires only 40 properties). Our models described above do
indeed pass these tests.
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Fig. 4. Optimised ISO-0 attack (one digit).
4.2. Optimising attacks
Having assured ourselves that our models are correct under our assumption of uniformly distributed PINs, we can
proceed to analyse the models for the best attack. For models where the best attack always determines the PIN, the
property we are interested in is the expected number of operations required. To determine this in PRISM, we model
check the property:
Rmin =? [F(P1_guessed ∧ P2_guessed ∧ P3_guessed ∧ P4_guessed){“init’’}{min}].
As used in this context, the F operator speciﬁes that the property must hold at some time in the future with probability 1.
By setting Rmin =?, we are asking PRISM to return the minimum expected cost required to arrive in a state where all
PIN digits are known, starting from the initial state. For some attacks, or combinations of attacks, it may not always
be possible to determine the PIN exactly. In these cases, we may be interested in knowing the attack which has the
highest probability of obtaining the PIN. This is determined by model checking the property (†) above. We may also
be interested in the attack with the highest probability of reducing the range of PINs to some particular size. The latter
can be obtained, for some limit on the size of PIN values k, by model checking
Pmax =? [true U PIN_Possibilitiesk].
Having obtained a measure of the performance of the best attack, we will often want to know exactly what the attack
is, i.e. how to perform it step by step. AnaBlock has a small script called ‘best-attack’ which takes the output from
PRISM and produces the attack. The inputs to the script are the list of states, the transition matrix labelled with
transition costs, and the cost/reward matrix. All of these can be obtained as output from PRISM, at the same time as
model checking is performed, using command line switches. The best attack is then reconstructed by the following
algorithm:
(1) Let r be the expected cost of the best attack. Let s be the initial state.
(2) If s is an endpoint, stop.
(3) Let count = 0.
(4) From state s, let T be the set of transitions corresponding to non-deterministic choice number count.
(5) Calculate r ′ = ∑t∈T P (t).C(t), where P(t) is the probability associated with transition t , and C(t) is the cost
associated with t .
(6) If r = r ′, increase count by 1, and go to 4.
(7) If r = r ′, store count as the non-deterministic choice to take at state s. For every state s′ reachable from s by the
chosen transitions, recursively call the procedure from step 2, with s = s′, and r the reward in the costs/reward
matrix for state s′.
The output from the script is a ﬁle in the format of the graph drawing program ‘dot’. An example is given in Fig. 4.
This is the optimised version of the ISO-0 attack, shown for one PIN digit.
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Table 1
Experiments with AnaBlock and PRISM
No. Attack P(determined) E(steps)
(1) ISO-0 (full) 1 13.6
(2) Dectab 1 16.145
(3) Dectab and ISO-0 (restricted) 1 15.275
(4) ISO-0, Check value and IBM 3624 PINs 1 57.8
No. Attack k = 400 k = 36 k = 24 k = 14 k = 1
(5) ISO-0 (restricted) 1 0 0 0 0
(6) Dectab no offset 1 1 0.568 0.064 0.001
(7) Dectab no offset and ISO-0 (restricted) 1 1 1 1 0.001
See text (Section 5 for details).
5. Results
To evaluate our system we conducted a series of experiments. These experiments were carried out with a generic
API, following that set out in [4, Section 3.3]. Our conﬁguration ﬁle has 13 settings (six commands, four block formats,
and three extra switches to lock-down the PAN, dectab and offset), allowing 213 different conﬁgurations. For our
experiments, we chose seven typical conﬁgurations, deliberately selected to allow different kinds of attack. The results
are summarised in Table 1.
(1) This is the most insecure conﬁguration, with all commands and block formats enabled. AnaBlock identiﬁes the
most effective attack as the full ISO-0 format attack, described in Section 2. Note that the performance of this
attack, with an expected 3.4 operations per digit, is as good as a binary search on individual digits, making it the
ideal attack of this type.
(2) With the PAN locked down, the intruder’s best option is the full dectab attack, as explained in Section 2.2.
(3) The conﬁguration for this experiment allows the PAN to vary, but does not support the VISA-3 block format. The
best attack discovered is a combination of the dectab attack with the restricted form of the ISO attack. The restricted
form consists of just the ﬁrst phase, as described in Section 2.AnaBlock’s tree uses these digitwise operations ﬁrst,
then continues with dectab operations. Interestingly, the dectab attack is not signiﬁcantly improved.
(4) This is a novel variation of the ISO-0 attack, that we discovered when analysing an API with no translation
function, but allowing IBM 3624 PIN veriﬁcation. The original version of the 3624 algorithm allows for the PIN to
be calculated based on validation data supplied by the user, that need not be the same as the PAN (some schemes,
for example, convert the PAN into validation data by taking the ASCII encoding of each decimal digit rather
than encoding the numbers directly). This gives the intruder the potential to independently vary the PAN and the
validation data as inputs to the veriﬁcation command. Given this ability, the intruder can perform operations like
ﬁrst XORing 1 against the ﬁrst digit of the PAN, increasing the offset by 1 in its third digit, and repeating the call
to the PIN verify command. If the verify call succeeds, then he knows that XORing 1 against the third digit of the
PIN decreases it by 1, i.e. the third digit of the PIN has bit 1 set. If the call fails, he knows that bit 1 must be unset.
He can repeat this for all bits of the PIN, increasing the offset by 2, by 4, and then by 8, and then repeat the whole
procedure for the fourth digit, thereby determining the last two digits of the PIN.
In this experiment, the conﬁguration ﬁle also enables the intruder to guess PINs by brute force, by enabling
the check value command. The performance of the resulting best attack reﬂects the fact that the ﬁrst part of the
attack uniquely determines the last two digits in an expected 7.2 operations, and then an expected 51 operations
are needed to determine the ﬁrst two digits (one call to the check value command, then an average of 50 guesses).
PRISM determined that the best scheme to carry out the ﬁrst part of the attack is to look ﬁrst at the 8-bit, since if
this is set, the 4-bit and the 2-bit must be unset, and need not be tested.
(5) This attack is the best available when no dectab operations are available, and only the ISO-0 block format is
supported. The k values in this part of the table represent the size of the PIN range. The ﬁgures in the table then
indicate the probability this attack has of reducing the PIN range to less than or equal to k. For the best restricted
ISO-0 attack, the PIN range is reduced to 400 with probability 1, but cannot be reduced further.
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Fig. 5. Attacks (6) and (7).
Table 2
Runtimes for the experiments
No. AnaBlock time PRISM time Total time
(1) 50min 38min 88min
(2) 71 s 7min 8min
(3) 56 s 11min 12min
(4) 3 s 43 s 46 s
(5) 3 s 14 s 17 s
(6) 10 s 2min 2min
(7) 25 s 16min 16min
(6) This attack is the dectab without the offset part. The conﬁguration ﬁle has the PAN and offset locked down. There
is only a 1 in 1000 chance of determining the PIN exactly (when all the digits are the same), but we can see that
the attack will certainly reduce the range to 36 possibilities, and has a good chance of reducing it still further.
(7) The conﬁguration ﬁle for this experiment allows the intruder to translate blocks and vary the PAN, but IBM 3624
PIN veriﬁcation is not supported, and neither is the VISA 3 format. The resulting best attack is a combination
of those available in (5) and (6). Having both available signiﬁcantly improves the best available attack. This is
illustrated clearly by the graph in Fig. 5. Here, the x-axis shows the values of k supplied to the model checker, i.e.
the number of possible PINs, and the y-axis shows the probability of reducing the number of possible PINs to less
that or equal to that k. Notice that even if the attacker’s only way of ﬁnally guessing PINs is to do it at an ATM,
where he only has three chances before the account in blocked, this attack gives him a good chance of success.
The run times for the experiments in Table 1 are shown in Table 2. These times were recorded on a 3.6GHz Pentium IV
machine running Linux 2.6.12 and Sun JRE 1.5.0. In general, the more secure the conﬁguration, the fewer options the
intruder has, so more secure conﬁgurations produce shorter run times. The model requiring the most memory was that
for experiment 3, which peaked at around 1.2Gb. Resource requirements vary depending on the Java virtual machine
(JVM) used, and the settings supplied to the JVM. A time-space trade-off can be made if one or the other of these
resources is limited (or cheap).
Our results give some new insights into the attacks, and their combination. The result from experiment (7) is
particularly interesting. Here, we can see what would happen if an API designer decided to lock down the offset, and
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chose to support only PIN block formats which do not allow the full ISO-0 attack. The system as a whole is still highly
vulnerable.
The AnaBlock source code and the ﬁles used for the experiments in Table 1 are available from
http://homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/gsteel/AnaBlock.
6. Related work
Most known API attacks are due to Bond [1] and Clulow [4]. Previous work on automated analysis of APIs has
looked at key-management schemes rather than PIN-processing, e.g. [9,6,13,14]. However, there has been somework on
probabilistic analysis of other security protocols. For example, Shmatikov analysed the ‘Crowds’ protocol for ensuring
anonymity using PRISM [12]. This protocol works by routing messages through a network in a random fashion, thereby
preventing even a group of colluding attackers from establishing the origin of messages. Shmatikov was able to ﬁnd
a previously unknown ﬂaw: as the group size increases, the attacker’s conﬁdence in the identity of the sender also
increases.
There is also related work in the ﬁeld of guessing attacks, e.g. [10,5]. The major difference between our work and
previous work in this area is that we consider ‘online’guessing rather than ‘ofﬂine’, where terms are merely considered
to be either guessable or not guessable. Our analysis considers the complexity of guessing particular terms, and the
effect of the HSM’s responses on that complexity.
Our approach has some similarities to the automated generation and analysis of attack graphs [11]. In this work, the
level of abstraction is much higher, with nodes representing tasks that the intruder must perform, like effecting a buffer
overﬂow attack. Tasks are assigned a probability of success, and graphs are checked to establish the overall chance
of a successful intrusion. There may be scope for some crossover here: our ideas for the use of costs to measure the
difﬁculty of an attack could be used to enhance attack graphs, or our attack trees could be included as subgraphs in
larger attack graphs used to represent the process by which an intruder might gains access to a running HSM, or obtain
a fake card.
7. Further work
The main focus of our future work will be to develop automated support for the generation of the API speciﬁcation
ﬁle. Thiswill involve choosing a speciﬁcation language for theAPI designers to describe the operation of their functions,
and then analysing these speciﬁcations to produce a set of all possible operations the intruder may call. This is quite an
ambitious goal, but it presents an interesting challenge, and may allow us to discover previously unknown attacks. By
hand-coding these speciﬁcation ﬁles we have already discovered a novel variant of an attack (in experiment 4, above
Section 4), which leads us to suspect that a comprehensive, automated approach to analysing these operations would
lead to the discovery of many more variations.
Another area for development is the breaking of symmetry in our PRISM models.We already try digitwise operations
in order, as described in Section 3. For the dectab attack, there is still some scope for breaking symmetries.After a correct
offset is discovered, the digits that are set to the dectab value could be shifted to the left and all remaining unknown
digits shifted to the right. This would have no effect on the complexity analysis, but would cut much duplication from
the model. Care would have to be taken when combining this with other attacks, however.
Our model as it stands abstracts away some detail from the attacks. For example, the HSM will not allow an attacker
to use an account number digit which is hexadecimal, which is required in the ISO-0 attack. In reality, depending on
the account number in use, he may have to make two XOR operations, to construct the required modiﬁcation value.
The ﬁnal outcome will be the same, but more operations may be required. To analyse this, we would also have to build
a model of uniformly distributed account number digits, which seems over-complex. Future work will try to address
this issue.
8. Conclusions
We have presented a framework for the analysis on PIN block attacks, based on constructing models with a mixture
of non-deterministic and probabilistic choices, and using a probabilistic model checker to ﬁnd the most effective attack.
This framework has been used to analyse three families of attacks in several variations and combinations. This ability to
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combine and vary attacks, without having to make changes to the model generation software, is a key advantage of our
approach. Our use of constraint logic programming made prototyping the system a relatively simple job. In particular,
it allowed us to easily generate the correct transition probabilities for the model.
Our framework seems to provide a good solution to the problem of ﬁnding and analysing the best attack once the
potential capabilities of the intruder have been established. The focus for our future work is to automate the generation
of these capabilities for a particular API speciﬁcation.
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